Global Business Cycles: Convergence or Decoupling? by Ayhan Kose, Christopher Otrok and Eswar Prasad

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Has globalization changed the mechanism of international transmission of business cycles?



 Provide a synthetic description of the change in business cycles transmission across a large number of countries using dynamic factor analysis (i.e. jazzed up principal component analysis)

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 Use this description to learn about international transmission and other issues (i.e. risk sharing)

An interpretation of the KOP main result

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- A methodological point
- Conclusions

Globalization has brought a "substantial convergence of business cycles among industrial economies and among EMEs but there has also been a substantial decoupling of business cycles *between* these two group of countries"

Percentage of output variance explained by: Industrial Countries 1960-1984 1985-2005 Global factor 27.68 9.36 Group factor 17.16 31.27

Emerging Countries			
	1960-1984	1985-2005	
Global factor	13.28	4.20	
Group factor	2.65	9.31	

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The reduced importance of the global factor and the increased importance of orthogonal group factors contribute, according to KOP, to the decoupling between industrial and emerging.

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Correlation raises from 0.5 (1960-1984) to 0.7 (1985-2005)!

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If group specific shocks become more correlated across groups and they become more important, the case for decoupling is not so clear! Consider a world with many countries and two shocks:

- A global real shock (i.e. Productivity slowdown, oil shocks, global tech. changes)
- Country specific financial shocks (i.e changes in supply of credit to firms)

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In a financially closed world financial shocks show up as idiosyncratic factors.

As economies open financial shocks aggregate (through a common financial market) into a global factor.

An alternative (more structural) interpretation, 2

- 1960-1985. Volatile global shock (Oil shocks) and financially closed economies so no other global factors
- 1985-2006. The global shock becomes less volatile (the good luck hypothesis) and at the same time economies open, so another global shock appears.

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Observe fall in the importance of real global factor and the emergence of a second financial global factor. Consistent with KOP evidence (small group factors in 60-84, large and correlated group factors in 85-05)

Why KOP did not find evidence of a second factor?

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Why KOP did not find evidence of a second factor?

- Factor analysis by KOP might have had trouble picking it up because the financial factor was not global in the first period and because it is collinear with the correlated group factors in the second period.
- An interesting test would be to run a factor analysis allowing for two global factors but no group factors.
- If my conjecture is right the second global factor should play almost the same role as the group factors

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Understanding the investment findings

- KOP find it puzzling that the share of investment variance attributable to group factors goes up in the globalization era.
- Fact is puzzling because in a period of open capital markets investment should respond more to idiosyncratic productive opportunities

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Understanding the investment findings

- KOP find it puzzling that the share of investment variance attributable to group factors goes up in the globalization era.
- Fact is puzzling because in a period of open capital markets investment should respond more to idiosyncratic productive opportunities
- Fact no longer puzzling if group specific shocks are interpreted as a global financial shock, which before globalization did not exist and after globalization affects investment strongly (consistent with most models)

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- The implications for stabilization policy in this new environment are, for me, an exciting and new research area