

1 Introduction

Probably so far in the macro sequence you have dealt directly with representative consumers and representative firms, meaning that you have solved some maximization problem of a fictitious single agent or single firm, assuming that this agent or firm was “representative” of the whole economy. What does “representative” exactly mean? Obviously it does not mean that knowing some variables for the average agent (for example its consumption, its wealth or its investment) tells you everything about all agents in the economy. Knowing, for example, that average household wealth in 2006 in the US is \$100000 does not tell you what is the fraction of US households in 2006 with 0 wealth. Representative here refers to the fact that a given set of aggregate variables (aggregate states) is enough to predict another set of aggregate variables of interest (for example prices) and to predict the evolution of aggregate states in the future. To continue with the previous example if knowing that average household wealth in 2006 in the US is \$100000 is enough to know average asset prices in 2006 and to predict average household wealth in 2007, then, for some questions, we do not need to worry about keeping track of the entire wealth distribution. In this lecture we will discuss in detail when and why it is enough to keep track only of averages, both in static and dynamic frameworks. In some sense aggregation is the foundation of all neo-classical macro.

2 Aggregate demand in partial equilibrium static framework

We start with an important result that is discussed in Mas-Colell et al. section 4.B which gives conditions under which we can ignore the distribution of wealth across consumers in order to know aggregate demand. In this simple example we’ll take prices as given. Consider a static economy with I consumers and L goods and assume that each consumer has wealth w_i and standard preferences (potentially different for every consumer) over consumption bundles. Solving a standard maximization problem yields (vector valued) demand functions for each consumer $x_i(p, w_i)$ and aggregate demand

$$x(p, w_1, \dots, w_I) = \sum_i x_i(p, w_i) \quad (1)$$

where p is the vector of prices of each good. Equation (1) tells us that in order to know aggregate demand (and thus, for example in a general equilibrium context, prices) one needs to know the entire distribution of wealth. We now ask when and if we can write aggregate demand as

$$X(p, \sum_i w_i) = \sum_i x_i(p, w_i), \quad \text{for every } p, (w_1, \dots, w_I) \quad (2)$$

In order for (2) to hold it must be that redistributing 1 dollar from consumer i to consumer j does not change aggregate demand or more generally for every change in the wealth distribution dw satisfying $\sum_i dw_i = 0$, for every p and for every (w_1, \dots, w_I)

$$\sum_i \frac{\partial x_{li}(p, w_i)}{\partial w_i} dw_i = 0 \quad \text{for every } l$$

but this can be true if and only if

$$\frac{\partial x_{li}(p, w_i)}{\partial w_i} = \frac{\partial x_{lj}(p, w_j)}{\partial w_j}, \quad \text{for every } l, p, (i, j), (w_1, \dots, w_I) \quad (3)$$

which means that any two individuals who face the same increment in wealth change the demand of any given good in exactly the same (across individuals) fashion. In words this means that if I give an extra dollar to each consumer, each consumer will exactly spend the same additional amount on, say, cherries. Graphically it means that wealth expansion paths for every consumer have to be linear in each good with the same (across consumers) slope (see Mas-Colell figure 4.B.1). It is easy to see that, if this is the case, in order to compute aggregate demand it is sufficient to know total wealth and it is not necessary to know how wealth is distributed. Proposition 4.B. 1 in Mas-Colell et al. gives necessary and sufficient condition for equation 3 to hold and obviously the conditions have to do with preferences. In particular it must be that the indirect utility function of each agent $V_i(p, w_i)$ must have the following form (also called the Gorman form)

$$V_i(p, w_i) = a_i(p) + b(p)w_i$$

How restrictive is this condition?

It is obviously pretty restrictive and it is easy to think of many different preferences in which this condition is not satisfied. But there are two interesting cases in which it is satisfied. One is the case in which all consumers have identical and homothetic preferences, where identical guarantees that $b(p)$ does not depend on i and homothetic guarantees that $b(p)$ does not depend on w , i.e. consumers with different wealth level have the same marginal utility from wealth. Another case is when preferences of all agents are quasilinear in the same good. It is sort of intuitive to see why this is the case: the Gorman form requires that the marginal utility of wealth is independent of wealth i.e. $\frac{\partial V_i(p, w_i)}{\partial w_i} = b(p)$. A simple application of the envelope theorem tells you that

$$\frac{\partial V_i(p, w_i)}{\partial w_i} = \lambda_i$$

where λ_i is the Lagrange multiplier on wealth. Taking each agent first order conditions for the good with quasi-linear preferences yields that λ_i is equal to the (constant) marginal utility of that good and so independent from wealth of that consumer: hence the result follows. In the next section we will discuss under which conditions the representative agent result applies for dynamic economies, in general equilibrium.

3 The representative agent result in dynamic general equilibrium economy

The objective of this section is to provide an example in which aggregate variables (in this case prices) at each point in time do not depend on the distribution of resources among agents of the economy at the moment in time, but only on average resources available at that point in time. So in other words it tells us under which conditions one can explain aggregate prices (such as, for example, interest rates or stock prices) using only aggregate variables, such as aggregate consumption or GDP. Note that this is both a dynamic and general equilibrium economy, as opposed to a static, partial equilibrium case considered in the previous section.

Consider an economy populated by N individuals, indexed by $i \in I = \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$. Each individual is infinitely lived. In each period there is one nonstorable consumption good. Each individual household has a stochastic endowment process $\{y_t^i\}$ of this consumption good. Let s_t and $s^t = (s_0, \dots, s_t)$ the event and event history of this economy, respectively. and $\pi_t(s^t)$ denote the objective probabilities of event histories. Agents subjective probability beliefs are assumed to coincide with these objective probabilities. Note that there is no need of additional assumptions about the stochastic process; in particular the individual processes need not be Markov processes nor to be independent across agents. Notice though that s^t is a pretty large set as it encompasses all histories of income of all agents in the economy.

Assume that $y_t^i \in Y$, a finite-dimensional set of cardinality M and define the aggregate state simply as $s_t = (y_t^1, \dots, y_t^N)$. Also take the event s_0 as given.

A consumption allocation $\{(c_t^i(s^t))_{i \in I}\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$ maps aggregate event histories s^t into consumption of agents $i \in I$ at time t . Preferences are identical across agents, additively time-separable and that agents discount the future at common subjective time discount factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$, so that the utility function takes the form

$$u^i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t \in S^t} \beta^t \pi_t(s^t) U^i(c_t^i(s^t)) \quad (4)$$

Definition 1 A consumption allocation $\{(c_t^i(s^t))_{i \in I}\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$ is feasible if

$$c_t^i(s^t) \geq 0 \text{ for all } i, t, s^t \quad (5)$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^N c_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{i=1}^N y_t^i(s^t) \text{ for all } t, s^t \quad (6)$$

A consumption allocation is Pareto efficient if it is feasible and there is no other feasible consumption allocation $\{(\hat{c}_t^i(s^t))_{i \in I}\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$ such that

$$u^i(\hat{c}^i) \geq u^i(c^i) \text{ for all } i \in I \quad (7)$$

$$u^i(\hat{c}^i) > u^i(c^i) \text{ for some } i \in I \quad (8)$$

4 Complete Markets and the Representative Agent

The key assumption that will allow us to get the representative agent result in this dynamic context is the one of complete markets. Complete markets means that there exist a full set of contingent claims (i.e. one claim for every possible realization of uncertainty) that are traded at time 0 before any uncertainty has been revealed. The individual Arrow-Debreu budget constraints take the form

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t \in S^t} p_t(s^t) c_t^i(s^t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t \in S^t} p_t(s^t) y_t^i(s^t) \quad (9)$$

where $p(s^t)$ is the period 0 price of one unit of period t consumption, delivered if event history s^t has realized.

Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium

Definition 2 An Arrow Debreu competitive equilibrium consists of allocations $\{(c_t^i(s^t))_{i \in I}\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$ and prices $\{p(s^t)\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$ such that

1. Given $\{p(s^t)\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$, for each $i \in I$, $\{c_t^i(s^t)\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$ maximizes (4) subject to (5) and (9)
2. $\{(c_t^i(s^t))_{i \in I}\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$ satisfies (6) for all t, s^t .

Now let us make the following assumption

Assumption 1: The period utility functions U^i are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave in its first argument and satisfy the Inada conditions

$$\lim_{c \rightarrow 0} U_c^i(c) = \infty \quad (10)$$

$$\lim_{c \rightarrow \infty} U_c^i(c) = 0 \quad (11)$$

It is then straightforward to prove the first welfare theorem for this economy (in fact, for this result we only need that the utility functions are strictly increasing). Hence any competitive equilibrium allocation is the solution to the social planners problem of

$$\max_{\{(c_t^i(s^t))_{i \in I}\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T} \sum_{i=1}^N \alpha^i u^i(c^i) \quad (12)$$

subject to (5) and (6), for some Pareto weights $(\alpha^i)_{i=1}^N$ satisfying $\alpha^i \geq 0$ and $\sum_{i=1}^N \alpha^i = 1$ (see, e.g. MasColell et. al.; this result requires parts of assumption 1). Attaching Lagrange multipliers $\lambda(s^t)$ to the resource constraint and ignoring the non-negativity constraints on consumption we obtain as first order necessary conditions for an optimum

$$\alpha^i \beta^t \pi_t(s^t) U_c^i(c_t^i(s^t), s^t) = \lambda(s^t) \quad (13)$$

for all $i \in I$. Hence for $i, j \in I$

$$\frac{U_c^i(c_t^i(s^t))}{U_c^j(c_t^j(s^t))} = \frac{\alpha^j}{\alpha^i} \quad (14)$$

for all dates t and all states s^t . Hence with a complete set of contingent consumption claims the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption of any two agents is constant across time and states. Also agents, *ceteris paribus* (i.e. if they have the same utility function), with higher relative Pareto weights will consume more in every state of the world because the utility function is assumed to be strictly concave.

Assumption 2: *All agents have identical CRRA utility,*

$$U^i(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} \quad (15)$$

with $\sigma \geq 0$ (for $\sigma = 1$ it is understood that utility is logarithmic). Here σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.

With this assumption (14) becomes

$$\frac{c_t^i(s^t)}{c_t^j(s^t)} = \left(\frac{\alpha^i}{\alpha^j} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \quad (16)$$

i.e. the ratio of consumption between any two agents is constant across time and states. This, in particular, implies that there exist shares $(\theta^i)_{i \in I}$ with $\theta^i \geq 0$ and $\sum_{i \in I} \theta^i = 1$ such that

$$c_t^i(s^t) = \theta^i \sum_{i \in I} y_t^i(s^t) \equiv \theta^i y_t(s^t) = \theta^i c_t(s^t) \quad (17)$$

where $y_t(s^t) = \sum_{i \in I} y_t^i(s^t)$ is the aggregate income in the economy and $c_t(s^t) = \sum_{i \in I} c_t^i(s^t)$ is aggregate consumption. In fact, the shares are given by

$$\theta_i = \frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^N \left(\frac{\alpha_j}{\alpha_i} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} = \frac{\alpha_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{\sum_{j=1}^N \alpha_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} \geq 0 \quad (18)$$

Note that when σ tends to ∞ (i.e. a very concave utility), for any distribution of Pareto weights a_i , we have that

$$\theta_i \rightarrow \frac{1}{N}$$

reflecting the fact that the benefit that the planner gets from transferring resources from a low weight agent to a high weight one is very quickly outweighed by the loss of utility due to concavity, so regardless of weights an equalitarian allocation would emerge. With logarithmic preferences ($\sigma = 1$) we have that $\theta_i = \alpha_i$, i.e. the share of aggregate consumption an agent i is allocated corresponds exactly to the Pareto weight the planner attaches to this agent. With σ approaching 0 (linear preferences) we have that

$$\theta_i = \begin{cases} 1/J & \text{if } \alpha_i = \max_i \alpha_i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where J is the number of agents got which $\alpha_i = \max_i \alpha_i$. The idea here is that when preferences are close to linear the benefit the planner gets from transferring resources from one individual to another not outweighed by concavity, hence even a small difference in weights leads to very large differences in allocation. This discussion helps us understand that “optimal” or “socially desirable”

amount of redistribution depends on individual preferences as well as on social preferences toward redistribution. Suppose for example distribution of wealth is very unequal. This would lead, for all preferences, to highly unequal distribution of consumption. Suppose now individuals have very curved preferences: in this case even a small degree of social preference toward equality (i.e. a egalitarian distribution of the α_i) would call for large redistribution of resources from rich to poor.

To sum up, with separable CRRA utility complete markets imply that individual consumption at each date, in each state of the world is a constant fraction of aggregate income (or consumption). Note that it does *not* imply that individual consumption is constant across time and states of the world, because it still varies with aggregate income (a variation against which no mutual insurance among the agents exists). It also does not imply that consumption among agents is equalized. From (16) we see that the level of consumption of agent i will depend positively on the Pareto weight of that agent.

Let's turn to the characterization of efficient (and hence equilibrium) allocations. The growth rate of consumption between any two dates and states is given from (17) as

$$\log \left(\frac{c_{t+1}^i(s^{t+1})}{c_t^i(s^t)} \right) = \log \left(\frac{c_t(s^{t+1})}{c_t(s^t)} \right) \quad (19)$$

that is, if agents have CRRA utility that is separable in consumption and we have complete markets, then individual consumption growth is perfectly correlated with and predicted by aggregate consumption growth. In particular, individual income growth should not help to predict individual consumption growth once aggregate consumption (income) growth is accounted for. This idea is the basis of all empirical tests of perfect consumption insurance, see e.g. Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), among others.

To obtain Arrow Debreu prices associated with equilibrium allocations we obtain from the consumer problem of maximizing (4) subject to (9) that

$$\frac{p(s^{t+1})}{p(s^t)} = \beta \frac{\pi_{t+1}(s^{t+1})}{\pi_t(s^t)} \frac{U_c^i(c_{t+1}^i(s^{t+1}))}{U_c^i(c_t^i(s^t))} \quad (20)$$

Under assumption 2 this becomes

$$\frac{p(s^{t+1})}{p(s^t)} = \beta \frac{\pi_{t+1}(s^{t+1})}{\pi_t(s^t)} \left(\frac{c_{t+1}^i(s^{t+1})}{c_t^i(s^t)} \right)^{-\sigma} \quad (21)$$

$$= \beta \frac{\pi_{t+1}(s^{t+1})}{\pi_t(s^t)} \left(\frac{c_{t+1}(s^{t+1})}{c_t(s^t)} \right)^{-\sigma} \quad (22)$$

and hence equilibrium Arrow Debreu prices can be written as functions of aggregate consumption only. We then have the following

Proposition 3 *Suppose allocations $\{(c_t^i(s^t))_{i \in I}\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}$ and prices $\{p(s^t)\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$ are an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Then under assumption 2 the allocation $\{c_t(s^t)\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$ defined by*

$$c_t(s^t) = \sum_{i \in I} c_t^i(s^t) \quad (23)$$

and prices $\{p(s^t)\}_{t=0, s^t \in S^t}^T$ is an Arrow Debreu equilibrium for the single agent economy with $I = 1$ in which the **representative agent** has endowment

$$y_t(s^t) = \sum_{i \in I} y_t^i(s^t) \quad (24)$$

and CRRA preferences.

Obviously the content of this proposition lies in the pricing part. It shows that to derive Arrow-Debreu prices (and hence all other asset prices), with complete markets it is sufficient to study the representative agent economy. This insight is the departure of the consumption-based asset pricing literature as developed in Lucas (1978). The discussion also suggests the steps that are needed to establish a representative agent result.

1. Solve the planning problem with many agents. The first welfare theorem and the Negishi-Mantel algorithm (which you will discuss in detail in the review session) enable us to solve a planning problem that yield allocations that coincide with equilibrium allocation.
2. Use allocations from planner's problem to construct aggregates (such as aggregate consumption or prices). In the simple example above aggregate consumption can be solved easily using feasibility and prices are solved using first order conditions of any agent.
3. Show that the same aggregates can be derived solving the equilibrium problem of a fictitious single agent.

Later we will use these three steps explicitly to establish a RA result in a more complex environment. Notice the two key assumptions for the proposition (and for extending the representative agent result in dynamic economies): identical-homothetic preferences and complete markets. The complete markets assumption guarantees that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at any two dates is equalized across all consumers. The identical-homothetic preferences guarantees that the common MRS is also equal to the MRS of the representative agent, i.e. the agent that has consumption equal to the aggregate. If both assumption are satisfied redistributing across consumers without changing the income of the representative agent does not change the MRS of the RA and so does not change the MRS of any consumer and hence does not change intertemporal prices. To make things more concrete consider a very simple example with two consumers which have time separable CRRA utility have the deterministic income sequences plotted below in the left panel of the figure. Using the result above we can show that consumption for each consumer is a fixed fraction of aggregate income. Note that even though consumptions are not equalized MRS are (with CRRA consumption marginal rate of substitution is proportional to consumption growth). In the right panel we consider perturbation which leaves total income unchanged but redistribute income from consumer 1 to consumer 2 in the first part of the sample. Obviously this perturbation does not change total consumption (simply due to feasibility) and in equilibrium it increases income and consumption of consumer 2 while it reduces reduces income and consumption of consumer 1.

The key point though is that this perturbation leaves MRS of each consumer unchanged and equal to the MRS of the representative agent.

Now consider the same perturbation in an environment without complete markets, i.e. with borrowing constraints. To make things simple assume that consumers are not allowed to borrow. In this world it is easy to see that consumption is equal to income for both consumers. But this implies that the perturbation analyzed in the picture does change the MRS of consumers, in particular it changes the MRS of consumer 2, which being the unconstrained one, has its MRS equalized to the interest rate. Hence the perturbation changes the interest rate and the representative agent result does not hold.




Figure 1: Consumption and income in complete markets

In one problem you will have to study what happens when you relax the identical preferences assumption but keep the complete markets assumption. The key insight is that in complete markets marginal utilities of each and every agent are proportional and thus, for asset pricing purposes, the marginal utility of any agent can be used. Notice though that when preferences are not identical across agents or are not homothetic equalization of marginal utilities no longer implies that consumption of each agent is a fixed share of aggregate endowment (or that the ratio of consumption between agent i and agent j is constant) and thus in order to compute the marginal utility of any agent we need to explicitly compute the consumption of that agent, which will in general depend on the structure of preferences across the economy. So when preferences are not identical across consumers and not homothetic in general the representative consumer result fails and in order to characterize prices or the evolution of aggregate variables one needs to know the entire distribution of resources across the economy. See also Guvenen (2012), Theorem 2, for more general conditions under which aggregation applies.

5 Recommended readings:

- Mas Colell et al., Section 4B
- Ljungqvist and Sargent, Sections 8.1 through 8.11
- Guvenen F. (2011), Macroeconomics With Heterogeneity: A Practical Guide, NBER Working paper 17622, Sections 2.1 and 2.2